Fiscal policy, the bond market and implications for monetary policy

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
Main messages

▶ Markets Risk of fiscal fatigue: more fiscal effort is needed but may lack political support, absent risk premium episodes.

BoE and Monetary policy


- Risk premiums complicate policy transmission and effectiveness.
- Ease monetary policy if spare capacity opens-up (on fiscal consolidation or US Tariffs), not on fiscal risk premium.
- Market liquidity: DMO changes preferred. QT changes and capacity to support market functioning facilitated by confidence in the fiscal path.
- ▶ Loosening the fiscal rules again would be a symptom of fiscal fatigue. More flexibility can come after more of a track record.

A public debt ratchet and an expanded BoE balance sheet



- ▶ Debt-to-GDP three times its average in MPC's first decade.
- ▶ QE shortened the effective maturity of public liabilities.

$r\uparrow$, $g\downarrow$. $(r - g)\uparrow\uparrow$



- \triangleright +50bp on interest rates, ~£8bn to public borrowing in 5Y.
- ▶ Fiscal and Monetary policies are not co-ordinated when based on different views of future productivity growth.


Stabilising debt. Fiscal space?

Required, Debt-stabilising, Primary Balance (% GDP) effective nominal interest rate, r

g	1.5	2	2.5	3	3.5	4	4.5
2.0	-0.49	0.00	0.49	0.98	1.47	1.96	2.45
2.5	-0.98	-0.49	0.00	0.49	0.98	1.46	1.95
3.0	-1.46	-0.97	-0.49	0.00	0.49	0.97	1.46
3.5	-1.93	-1.45	-0.97	-0.48	0.00	0.48	0.97
4.0	-2.40	-1.92	-1.44	-0.96	-0.48	0.00	0.48


Note: Calculations assume Debt/GDP at 100% and no stock-flow adjustments, for different combinations of 'r' and 'g'.

Expect delays




► Even excl. 2020/21, 't+4' forecast error on the OBR's primary balance forecast averages -2.4pp.

Market expectations of 'r'




▶ Hard-to-learn, medium-term features, eg r* and trend productivity growth, lead to serially-correlated revisions (Leland et al, 2024).

Bouts of (Sterling) risk premium




- Instability reflects changeable roles for different shocks.
- ▶ Demand news pushes Yields and Currency in same direction ($\rho > 0$). Risk premium news pushes them in opposing directions ($\rho < 0$).
- ▶ January episode a much smaller and more temporary bout of risk premium than Truss mini-Budget.

Quantifying the risk premium effect (in January)




- ▶ Risk premium effect accounts for even more of the move in foreign exchange than in bonds.
- The fiscal buffer is too small, regardless of the source of shock.

BoE: Risk premium episodes complicate policy transmission + 'predictable' MPC Comms




The Output gap still positive, for now?




Sticky wage growth a symptom of U/V curve's shift outward and (slightly) higher U^* vs. pre-Covid.

US Tariffs: Decomposing GBP market reactions




▶ Predominantly, a negative Demand shock, with some Risk premium effect.

BoE: weak Demand effects are more Dovish than Risk premium effects



- ▶ 'Weaker demand' is Dovish in a way the 'risk premium' is not.
- ▶ Needed: allowance for a US risk premium and its spillovers.

The fiscal reaction. Fiscal fatigue?



- Needed: a positive reaction in the primary balance to higher net debt, amid higher 'r' and lower 'g'.
- Looser fiscal rules would reinforce a sense of UK fiscal fatigue.

Conclusions

▶ Markets Risk of fiscal fatigue: more fiscal effort is needed but may lack political support, absent risk premium episodes.

BoE and Monetary policy

- Risk premiums hinder policy transmission and effectiveness.
- Ease monetary policy if spare capacity opens-up (on fiscal consolidation or US Tariffs), not on fiscal risk premium.
- Interventions to support market functioning or QT changes also facilitated by confidence in the fiscal path.
- ▶ Loosening the fiscal rules again would be a symptom of fiscal fatigue. More flexibility can come after more of a track record.